Zhou Enlai and the Party's Early Hidden Front

Zhang Shujun
 

In the arduous and long course of struggle of the Communist Party of China, compared with the open battlefield where the enemy fought face to face, there was a hidden front that played an important role in winning the victory of the revolution. What is less known is that Zhou Enlai is the main founder and outstanding commander of this front. The party's hidden front includes intelligence, organization, communication and other aspects. It is a highly scientific art of struggle. It should not only grasp the strategic level from the macro level, but also carefully examine every tactical link and even every detail. In important historical events such as the August 1st Nanchang Uprising and the creation of the "Central Special Branch", Zhou Enlai carefully planned and worked hard to give full play to the unique role of the hidden front in different historical periods and specific historical scenes, thus establishing immortal feats in the struggle against the enemy.

      A Successful Attempt to Conceal Work -- Nanchang Uprising on August 1
 

On July 15, 1927, Wang Jingwei openly betrayed the revolution after Chiang Kai-shek and raised a butcher's knife to the Chinese Communists and the revolutionary masses. On July 24, the Provisional Standing Committee of the Central Committee and the representatives of the Communist International carefully analyzed the revolutionary situation, decided to resolutely counterattack the Kuomintang reactionaries, carried out a revolutionary armed uprising in Nanchang, and established Zhou Enlai as the secretary, Yun Daiying, Li Lisan, and Peng Pai as members. Committee of the former enemies of the Communist Party of China. This is a major decision related to the fate and future of the Communist Party. No information is allowed to be leaked. Zhou Enlai pays special attention to strictly controlling the scope of intelligence from the source. On July 25, Zhou Enlai left for Jiujiang from Wuhan. When he left, he kept his mouth shut about his wife Deng Yingchao. Deng Yingchao later recalled: "Zhou Enlai didn't tell me before and after dinner until he was leaving Wuhan that he would leave for Jiujiang that night. What to do, how long to stay, nothing to say, I have become accustomed to confidentiality, nothing to ask. At that time, there was a great enemy and everyone was full of hatred. We just shook hands tightly and said goodbye in silence... Later we read the newspaper of the Kuomintang, and only then did we know that the Nanchang Uprising had taken place."
 

On July 27, Zhou Enlai, escorted by Chen Geng and others, secretly arrived in Nanchang via Jiujiang. That night, he stayed in an apartment at No. 2 Huayuan Corner and met Zhu De, who had first come to Nanchang to prepare for the uprising. According to the instructions of his superiors, Zhu De carefully drew a map of Nanchang city to learn more about the deployment of enemy forces. He also had frequent contact with several heads of the Kuomintang's third and ninth armies stationed in Nanchang, kept abreast of the enemy's situation at any time, and successfully covered the arrival of some uprising leaders in Nanchang. When Zhu De put the required geographical and military materials on the table, Zhou Enlai was very satisfied and praised Zhu De's hard work for not being in vain and doing a great thing for the party! Especially when the Nanchang Uprising started, Zhu De also held two enemy commanders and one regiment deputy in the name of a banquet, and more effectively cooperated with the Nanchang Uprising.
 

Zhou Enlai knew very well that the party organization in the army was extremely secret, and in order to ensure the concealment of the battle, he made strict and meticulous arrangements, and even in the first two days of the uprising, the venue remained on high alert. At about 2: 00 p.m. on July 30, at the 24th division headquarters of the 11th army in a teaching building on the bank of Baihuazhou, ye ting called a meeting of officers above the battalion commander level. the venue was temporarily arranged, and there were guards standing guard in the distance. no idle person was allowed to enter. at the same time, the headquarters of the 20th army stationed at hongdao middle school and inside the church of the anglican society in jiangxi province on zigu road, he long also held a meeting of officers at and above the rank of regiment commander. The regimental and battalion-level officers who learned of the Nanchang Uprising plan also kept secrets. Yuan Yelie, then commander of the Third Battalion of the 72nd Regiment of the 24th Division of the 11th Army, later recalled: "Among the officers of our battalion, the deputy battalion commander is a member of the National Party. Among the company commanders and instructors, there are three members of the National Party, and the platoon leader is more Chinese than Communist Party members. Although these Kuomintang members are considered to be progressive and may follow the Communist Party, their determination in fighting the Kuomintang army has yet to be tested. Especially because they have many Huangpu classmates in each other, it is very possible to send a message intentionally or unintentionally. In order to strictly guard military secrets and ensure the victory of the battle, I personally organized the preparatory work before the war."
 

The order was concealed and passed down step by step. The company-level cadres did not receive the combat mission until the team set out. When they learned the earth-shattering news of preparing for the Nanchang Uprising, everyone had only one thing on their mind, which was to calculate when to pass the mission to the platoon leader, squad leader and soldiers. On the afternoon of July 31, Su Yu, then the squad leader of the Revolutionary Committee of the Nanchang Uprising, received the order to "wipe weapons, replenish ammunition, and get ready to go. After dark, the soldiers were fully armed at the camp, sitting on their backpacks and muttering in private: there's going to be a war! Who should we fight with? Should they fight us, or should we? Zhou Enlai happened to pass by the soldiers. He stopped for a while and said to everyone: "Comrades, we are going to prepare for a war. Are you afraid?" Everyone answered together: "No!" Zhou Enlai went on to say, "Good! We are completely sure of victory in this war. You are ready to accept the glorious task!" As for the non-combatants, it was only after the battle had begun that they learned of the uprising, and Hu Yuxiu, a female soldier working in the Military Staff Committee at the time, recalled: "That night, Zhiyuan and I were sleeping when we heard the rumbling of artillery on all sides. It was not until dawn that we finally got the delightful news: 'Our army has revolted! '"
 

At two o'clock in the morning on August 1, the troops of the Nanchang Uprising took a surprise attack on the unprepared enemy troops according to the pre-reconnaissance direction. The enemy panicked and quickly disintegrated. These actions are closely related to the excellent intelligence and confidentiality work under the leadership of Zhou Enlai. Strategically guaranteed the launch and success of the Nanchang Uprising.
 

      Creation of a specialized working body-"Central Special Branch"
 

In September 1927, the CPC Central Committee moved to Shanghai. It is not only an important base for imperialist aggression against China, but also a stronghold for counter-revolutionary forces. At the same time, "once the revolutionary situation changed, many party members wavered passively and even openly betrayed the party, surrendered to the enemy and framed comrades". "The incident of the voluntary surrender and informant rebellion gradually spread to the party headquarters at all levels across the country from the south to the north." Faced with the cruel situation of the reactionary authorities' rigorous raids and bloody massacres, it is extremely difficult to preserve the party organizations in the vast areas under the rule of the Kuomintang, and it is extremely difficult to consolidate and develop them. Zhou Enlai deeply realized that a special working organization must be established, and he proposed to the Party Central Committee to establish a "Central Special Branch".
 

The Central Special Branch took Li Qiangyi of the former Secret Service Department of the Central Military Commission in Wuhan as its backbone, and absorbed some comrades from the Shanghai Underground Party, under the command of Zhou Enlai. The main tasks of this organization are to collect intelligence, punish traitors, rescue comrades, combat the enemy, and protect the safety of the central organs. Zhou Enlai devoted a lot of effort to the establishment, development, improvement and a series of activities of the Central Special Branch, formulated a set of policies and principles, and paid attention to practical experience. When the enemy's white terror was extremely serious and the working conditions were extremely dangerous, Zhou Enlai held a training class for the Central Special Branch. Zhou Enlai personally gave a political report to the training class on the policies and principles of the struggle against the enemy. At the same time, he learned the techniques and disciplines of secret work, such as disguise reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance of roads and residential houses in Shanghai, code deciphering, secret writing techniques and unfettering techniques after being captured by the enemy, and went to the sea by boat for shooting training.
 

Under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, the Central Special Branch has gradually established four sections with their own division of labor and close cooperation according to the needs of the work. The first section is the General Affairs Section, which is responsible for general affairs. The second section is the intelligence section, which is responsible for intelligence work. The third section is the action section, which undertakes the tasks of punishing secret agents and suppressing traitors. The fourth section is the radio communication section, which is responsible for radio communication. After the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in order to strengthen the leadership of the Central Special Branch, on November 14, 1928, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee decided to establish a "special committee" of the Central Committee, referred to as the "special committee". It is composed of Xiang Zhongfa, Zhou Enlai and Gu Shunzhang. Zhou Enlai is the decision maker, while Gu Shunzhang is in charge of daily work and Xiang Zhongfa is named. That is to say, "Zhou Enlai is the soul and decision maker of the special committee".
 

In the actual work against the enemy, Zhou Enlai personally guided the Central Special Branch to establish a strong anti-espionage relationship in the Kuomintang's professional anti-communist leadership. For example, Yang Dengying, who won the trust of Chen Lifu and Zhang Daofan and was later formally appointed as the special commissioner of the Kuomintang Central Committee in Shanghai by Chen Lifu, has been working for the Central Special Branch since joining the Kuomintang reconnaissance organs. He has repeatedly provided the action plan taken by the Kuomintang secret service organs against the Communist Party, identified the traitors and spies hidden within our party, actively rescued the arrested comrades, and skillfully recaptured the party's confidential documents from the enemy, it has made important contributions to the security of the Party Central Committee and the accurate attack on the enemy and the severe punishment of traitors by the Central Special Branch. Another example is Song Zaisheng, a political secret inspector of the Kuomintang's Shanghai Security Command, who was also an anti-espionage officer placed inside the enemy by the Central Special Branch. He once assisted Chen Geng in executing two spies and traitors who tried to inform the enemy of Li Weihan and Li Lisan. During the CPC Central Committee's stay in Shanghai, the Central Special Branch hidden front led by Zhou Enlai played an irreplaceable role. On many occasions, at the critical juncture when the enemy took destructive actions against the central organs, the timely transmission of accurate information has bought time for the party to transfer and take contingency measures, and ensured the safety of the central organs. However, unexpected changes still occurred, which severely tested the Central Special Branch led by Zhou Enlai.
 

On April 24, 1931, Gu Shunzhang, head of the Central Special Branch, defected to the enemy immediately after his arrest in Wuhan. He has been responsible for the security work of the Party Central Committee organs for a long time, is very familiar with the party's secret work, and knows the important organs and leaders' residences of the Central Committee in Shanghai like the back of his hand. After receiving the news of Gu Shunzhang's defection, Zhou Enlai was not afraid of danger. He made prompt and orderly arrangements. On the same day, they agreed on countermeasures with Chen Yun, and with the assistance of Nie Rongzhen, Chen Geng, Li Kinong, Li Qiang and others, they quickly took a series of emergency measures: destroying confidential documents; quickly transferring the main leaders of the party and taking strict security measures; and transferring all their secretaries who might be known to Gu Shunzhang; all cadres familiar to Gu Shunzhang who may become his reconnaissance targets will be transferred to safe areas or transferred from Shanghai as soon as possible; Cut off all important relationships that Gu Shunzhang can use in Shanghai; Abolish all secret working methods and secret signals known to Gu Shunzhang, and all departments will implement urgent changes. Under Zhou Enlai's strict deployment, all the organs of the CPC Central Committee, Jiangsu provincial Party committee and the Far East Bureau of the Communist International were transferred that night. Zhou Enlai led the Central Special Branch to fight day and night, and finally caught a beautiful time difference in front of the enemy, causing the enemy to fight everywhere, and the plot to wipe out the underground organization of the Communist Party of China was completely shattered.
 

Although the enemy's plot did not fully succeed, Zhou Enlai deeply reflected on the work of the Central Special Branch. The enemy's large-scale manhunt in Shanghai damaged the CPC Central Committee and local party organizations, and many Communist Party members were arrested and killed. Zhou Enlai believed that although there were many achievements in the work of the Central Special Branch, all the work was affected because of Gu Shunzhang's betrayal. This is the result of the shortcomings of the Teko work itself, the root of which is the lack of political education, and said that he should bear the main responsibility.
 

In early December 1931, according to the decision of the Central Committee, Zhou Enlai left Shanghai to serve as secretary of the Central Bureau of the Central Soviet Area. The Central Taco was not abolished until September 1935. From 1927 to 1931, the Central Special Branch led by Zhou Enlai waged an arduous and covert struggle against the enemy, played an important role in the struggle against the enemy, and made indelible achievements in the history of the struggle of the Communist Party of China.
 

(Responsible editor: Wu Chun)

March 8, 2018 Source: China Discipline Inspection and Supervision News