Four Crossings of Chishui: A Model of Unexpected Victory

At the beginning of 1935, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops from the Central Army of the Kuomintang and warlords in Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and other provinces in an attempt to wipe out more than 30000 Red Army in one fell swoop. According to the decision of the Zunyi Conference, Comrade Mao Zedong and other revolutionaries of the older generation planned to lead the Red Army to set out from the Zunyi area and cross the Yangtze River in the north from Luzhou to Yibin. Starting from January 19, the Red Army troops marched in the direction of Tucheng in three ways, and a wonderful drama in the history of war quietly kicked off. This was the Battle of Sidu Chishui, which was praised by Comrade Mao Zedong as a "proud pen. In this battle, the Red Army defeated the strong by the weak and won by surprise, leaving us an extremely valuable military legacy.
　　A crossing of Chishui is a great opportunity.
Before dawn on January 29, 1935, the main force of the Red Army marched towards Gulin and Xuyong areas, planning to cross the Yangtze River northward. The Sichuan Army immediately chased me with 8 brigades of troops, and blocked the Yangtze River with 4 brigades, blocking the Red Army's northward advance. road. The Kuomintang Central Army Xue Yue Corps and the Guizhou Army pursued south Sichuan from Guizhou, and the three Yunnan Army brigades rushed to Bijie and Zhenxiong in an attempt to encircled the Red Army. There was an enemy fortification along the coast before, and a pursuer on the road after. In the face of the critical war situation, Comrade Mao Zedong made a decisive decision to cross the Chishui sword, pointing to the empty border area of Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan provinces, and suspending the northward crossing of the Yangtze River. It is designed to preserve military power and stand by for annihilation or maneuvering.
Despite the difficulties and dangers encountered, Comrade Mao Zedong and other revolutionaries of the older generation were calm, took advantage of the situation, jumped out of the trap of thinking, and changed the established plan in due course. It can not only grasp the favorable fighters, so that the Red Army can smoothly separate from the enemy according to the organizational system, but also carefully study the advantages and disadvantages of the enemy and ourselves, quickly draw up the most favorable plan, and constantly strive for the initiative on the battlefield.
　The second crossing of Chishui is a strange thought.
After the Red Army assembled Tashi, the Kuomintang army judged that the direction of our action was still to cross the Yangtze River in the north and rendezvous with the Red Fourth Front Army, so it mobilized the main force in a vain attempt to encircled and annihilate our army in the areas south of the Yangtze River, west of Xuyong and east of Hengjiang. After carefully analyzing the situation, Comrade Mao Zedong believed that the weakest part of the enemy's encirclement of the Red Army was the Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie's department in northern Guizhou, so he decided to use the enemy's illusion of judgment to go in the opposite direction, marching eastward, and taking advantage of the enemy's weakness to return to Guizhou.
On February 11, in the face of the threat of the enemy's advance on Tashi, Comrade Mao Zedong unexpectedly commanded the Red Army to move eastward and re-enter Guizhou. Upon hearing the news, Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie hurriedly transferred his troops to the Chishui River in an attempt to block our army's eastward crossing. On the 18th, our vanguard troops rushed to the east bank of the Chishui River and fought on the back of Erlang Beach, beating the enemy to death. From the 18th to the 21st, our army crossed Chishui at Taipingdu and Erlang Beach, throwing away the Sichuan army and other enemies pursuing behind them, so that their attempts to block and encirclement our army were defeated. After crossing the Chishui River, our army made rapid progress and launched the Battle of Zunyi when the defending enemy forces in Tongzi and Zunyi areas were weak. Occupy Tongzi on the 24th, break through the steep terrain of Loushan Pass on the 25th, and occupy Zunyi on the 28th.
The victory of the battle of Zunyi reflects the advantage of reverse thinking. Soldiers are impermanent, water is impermanent, combat is different from other areas of human activities, in many situations there is no precedent to follow, only surprise, innovation can win. Using reverse thinking to plan operations can eliminate the disadvantages brought about by fixed and rigid fixed thinking and positive thinking, and make specific analysis of specific problems. In the face of the encirclement carefully constructed by the Kuomintang army, Comrade Mao Zedong did not persist in crossing the Yangtze River northward, but used reverse thinking to analyze the weak links of the enemy from another angle. He did not advance but retreated, and won the biggest victory since the Long March.
　　Three crossing Chishui, seeking a strange situation 
After our army won the great victory in Zunyi, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly flew to Chongqing to "supervise the war" and moved out the fortress policy of attacking the base area of the Central Red Army, in a vain attempt to use the tactics of combining fortress doctrine with key attacks to carry out a north-south attack and oppress our army in the narrow areas of Zunyi and Yaxi. To this end, Jiang also ordered: "Sichuan and Guizhou armies shall not advance or retreat without authorization." Comrade Mao Zedong had an insight into the situation, and deliberately wandered around the Zunyi area to find the enemy, pretending to attack, in order to induce more enemies to come to gather, laying the groundwork for getting rid of the enemy.
Since March 5, the Red Army has relied on the favorable terrain of Tongzi and Zunyi lines to attract the Sichuan army to the east, while the main force from Zunyi area westward to Bailakan, Changgan Mountain and other areas to seek opportunities to wipe out the enemy. When the enemy approached again, in order to further confuse the enemy and seek the opportunity to wipe out the enemy in the movement, Comrade Mao Zedong led the Red Army to cross the Chishui River for the third time via Maotai on March 16, marching in the direction of Gulin and Xuyong, pretending to cross the Yangtze River northward. Chiang Kai-shek thought that our army was going to cross the Yangtze River to the north, so he urgently ordered the warlord troops of Sichuan, Guizhou, Hunan and other provinces and the central army to pursue me, and then transferred the Yunnan army to intercept me from Bijie in an attempt to form an encirclement of me again.
Throughout the campaign, the threat of the Kuomintang army existed at all times. One was more than 30000, one was more than 400000, one was short of supplies, and the other was full. The Red Army had a great disparity in strength compared with the Kuomintang army. Comrade Mao Zedong actively planned to create a situation, commanding the Red Army to skillfully interspersed among the Kuomintang army's heavy groups through continuous movement, or to strike east and west, or to release smoke screens, or to send feint soldiers, to constantly create false situations, and to use the radio station to grasp the changes in the enemy's situation at the right time, so that the Red Army can know itself and know the enemy, so that the enemy can not find out the real situation of the Red Army and win the initiative again.
　　Four crossing Chishui, adjusting the enemy's strange 
After crossing Chishui three times, our army entered southern Sichuan again. The enemy still judged that I wanted to cross the Yangtze River north, and all enemy forces attacked southern Sichuan again. Comrade Mao Zedong made a decisive decision at the moment and decided to take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness and turn to the east, and disguised himself as the main force of the Red Army with a regiment to feign at Gulin and other places to lure the enemy to the west. At this moment, all Kuomintang troops seized the time to gather and prepare to encircle the Red Army in Gulin and other places, but unexpectedly, our army had moved secretly and quickly and returned to the east. On the evening of March 21, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River for the fourth time via Erlang Beach, Jiuxikou and Taipingdu respectively. It turned south and ran against the enemy going north. On the 28th, it broke through the enemy blockade line between Yaxi and Bailakan. On the 31st, it crossed the Wujiang River south, pointing to Guiyang and leaving the enemy far behind.
Operational decision-making not only requires active planning to create a situation, but also needs to mobilize the enemy to a certain extent, so that the enemy's situation is conducive to our actions. After the Red Army was blocked from crossing the river in southern Sichuan, it was a dilemma. In front of it was the "iron plate array" arranged by the Sichuan Army in Luzhou and Yibin, and behind it was the "pocket array" arranged by the Kuomintang Central Army, the Guizhou Army, and the Yunnan Army ". Comrade Mao Zedong and other revolutionaries of the older generation fully grasped the changes in the situation of the enemy and ourselves and the actual situation of the battlefield environment in Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan. They neither risked crossing the Yangtze River northward nor retreated passively. Instead, they took advantage of the situation and mobilized the enemy to the position envisaged by their own side. Like a thousand catties, the most suitable path was found in the dilemma.
 

Source: Liberation Army Daily