Jude: How the stars shine

General Secretary Xi Jinping commented that Zhu De "is a superstar among the bright stars of our national heroes". This superstar radiates a dazzling light in the history of the Chinese revolution, especially in the history of military affairs. Zhu De participated in the Revolution of 1911, the National Defense Movement, the Law Protection Movement, the Northern Expedition, the Nanchang Uprising, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the War of Resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation, and made great contributions to the establishment and development of the People's Army. On November 30, 1946, Yan'an held a conference to celebrate Zhu De's 60th birthday. Zhou Enlai pointed out: "in the whole party, you first cooperated with Comrade Mao Zedong to create the army of the Chinese people, establish the base area of the people's revolution, and set a new record for the Chinese revolution."

For the first time, the "Sixteen-character formula" in guerrilla warfare was proposed"

After the rendezvous in Jinggangshan, Zhu De was mainly responsible for commanding the military. He proposed the "16-character formula" based on the balance of power between the enemy and us and the actual situation in Jinggangshan ". Nie Rongzhen once pointed out: "during the Jinggangshan period, in order to effectively deal with the enemy's 'advance and suppression' and 'encirclement and suppression', Comrade Zhu de explored a set of effective methods of play through practice, and then rose to theory. He put forward the famous 16-character formula of 'enemy advance and I retreat, enemy stationed in me, enemy tired and I fought, enemy retreated and I chased, ', which was affirmed by Comrade Mao Zedong. In his later book" Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War, "Comrade Mao Zedong praised the 16-character formula as a" simple basic principle of guerrilla warfare'." On April 5, 1929, in a letter to the Party Central Committee, the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army formally summarized the operational principles of the Red Army's guerrilla warfare as "the enemy advances and we retreat, the enemy is stationed and we disturb, the enemy is tired and we fight, and the enemy retreats and we chase". On September 28 of the same year, the Party Central Committee called it the "16-character formula" for the first time in a letter of instructions to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army ".

Zhu De's "16-character formula" is not accidental, and it is closely related to his rich military activities in his early years. "Starting from the Revolution of 1911, we fought with the Beiyang warlords in Sichuan and Yunnan for 10 years, and always won the crowd with a small number. The main military experience was the adoption of the methods of guerrilla warfare. I remember when I was studying military affairs in Moscow, the instructors tested me and asked me how to fight after I returned to China. I replied: the tactics are" fight if you win, and leave if you don't win "," drag the team up the mountain when necessary '. It was also criticized at the time. In fact, this is the idea of guerrilla warfare. So, at this point, I took the lead." The "16-character formula" is a great military creation of Zhu de, which laid the military theoretical foundation for the victory of the people's revolutionary war.

systematically expounds the importance of the strategic position of the northeast

On August 23, 1945, Zhu De spoke at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and pointed out: We must go to the three eastern provinces and send a large number of cadres to carry out work. On August 28, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei left Yan'an and flew to Chongqing to negotiate with the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek. On the afternoon of the day when Zhu De sent them away, he pointed out in a report to the cadres of the central government in the central auditorium: Mao Zedong went to Chongqing for negotiations and came back safely. The possibility is great. The negotiations will have results, but they will not go so smoothly. We must actively develop to the northeast. He believes that the strategic position of the Northeast is extremely important. If our army acquires the Northeast, it can connect the Northeast and North China and avoid being attacked by Chiang Kai-shek's army. There are many articles to do in the northeast. Chiang Kai-shek's troops "are mostly in the south, and it will take half a year to reach the northeast." "Even if they arrive, he has a million people, and we also have a million people. At most, he occupies the city and I occupy the countryside". We will now send 50000 troops and 10,000 cadres, and we will send more people in the future. At the same time, he also warned everyone: we go to the northeast to do hard mass work, not to be officials, but to do things, to win over the 30 million masses to be with us. We have great hopes of turning the Northeast into a democratic Northeast.

Zhu De not only analyzed the importance of the strategic position of the Northeast when reporting to cadres, including those who are going to work in the Northeast, but also expounded the importance of the Northeast many times at the central meeting. On September 14, 1945, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting to listen to the report of Zeng Kelin, commander of the Shenyang Garrison District, on the work in the Northeast and discuss the work in the Northeast. On September 17, Zhu De, together with Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi, called Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in Chongqing to put forward the strategic policy of "advancing northward and defending southward. He advocated striving for the northeast and controlling Jehe and Chahar. In addition to sending troops to the northeast, we must immediately mobilize 100000 to 150000 troops to go to eastern Hebei and Jehoe. At the two Politburo meetings on September 19 and September 26, Zhu De still emphasized the importance of fighting for the Northeast.

A comprehensive summary of a set of battle experience

On March 26, 1947, the Party Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau in Zaolingou, Qingjian County, northern Shaanxi. The five secretaries carried out a division of labor. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi and others stayed in northern Shaanxi to command the liberation war in the northwest and the whole country. Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi and others formed the Central Working Committee and went to North China to carry out the work entrusted by the Central Committee.

As soon as Zhu De arrived in Pingshan County, the Jinchaji base area, he discussed with the leaders of the Jinchaji Military Region and decided that Nie Rongzhen would convene a meeting of cadres above the regiment level to sum up the past combat experience and lessons. Subsequently, they specifically helped them reorganize the field army and set up the logistics department of the military region to perform their respective duties. His pioneering and fruitful work laid the foundation for the victory of the Jinchaji Field Army in the Qing (County) Cang (County) campaign, the Baotou (Dingbei) campaign in mid-to-late June, the Hebei campaign in the Qing Dynasty in early September and the Qingfengdian campaign in mid-to-late October. After the Battle of Qingfengdian, Zhu De and Nie Rongzhen, commander of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, considered the next step to attack the enemy's heavily fortified city of Shijiazhuang.

On November 6, 1947, the battle of Shijiazhuang began. After seven days of fierce fighting, the Jinchaji Field Army wiped out more than 24000 enemies, creating a successful example of the People's Liberation Army capturing big cities. From the preparation before the battle, the process of the battle to the summary after the battle, Zhu De's painstaking efforts and sweat were all condensed. He summed up a set of attack tactics, such as continuous blasting, tunnel operation, trench operation, concentrated firepower, breakthrough, interspersed and divided, and so on, which were quickly extended to all battlefields throughout the country, providing experience for guiding the battle, and playing a major role in accelerating the victory of the national war of liberation. On December 10, Zhu De wrote a letter to the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong. The letter summarized the experience of the Shijiazhuang campaign and was highly valued by the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong. The Party Central Committee immediately forwarded Zhu De's letter to the central bureaus and field armies., Require compliance.

In addition to the specific guidance of the Shijiazhuang battle, Zhu De also guided the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region's Linfen battle. At the critical moment when the Northeast Field Army was not sure about Changchun's attack, Zhu De proposed that Changchun might have many conditions to attack, and put forward two attack plans: strong attack and long encirclement.

Science foresaw the course of victory in the war of liberation

With the development and change of the war situation, the issue of the strategic decisive battle between the people's Liberation Army and the Kuomintang army has been put on the agenda of the CPC Central Committee, and Zhu de is also considering the relevant issues of the strategic decisive battle. and made a scientific prediction of the three decisive battles in Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin, which is mainly reflected in the four speeches of the Operations Bureau of the headquarters of the people's Liberation Army.

The first time was on August 23, 1948. Zhu De expressed his views on the tasks of the third year of the War of Liberation, the location, timing and conditions of the strategic decisive battle. The second time was on October 1, 1948. Zhu De analyzed the situation in various strategic areas. He said: It is no longer possible for the enemies in the northeast to enter the customs. We can eliminate them in the northeast. The third time was on October 16, 1948, when Zhu De foresaw the process of the three decisive battles. The fourth time was on November 26, 1948. Zhu De pointed out: The decisive battle in the Northeast has wiped out the enemy. Now, the decisive battle is being fought in the Xuzhou area, and the decisive battle between Pingjin and Tianjin is about to begin. Zhu De's four speeches at the combat situation report meeting of the Headquarters Operations Bureau incisively analyzed the situation in various battlefields across the country, and played a major role in the People's Liberation Army's large-scale strategic operations and victory. At the all-army logistics conference in December 1948, Zhu de proposed that the Kuomintang would be fundamentally overthrown within one year, and the United States would neither send troops nor dare to send troops, and predicted that the people's Liberation Army would cross the Yangtze River after a rest in the spring of 1949. After that, the specific progress and development of the PLA in various major battles fully demonstrated Zhu De's exquisite command art and strategic level as the highest military leader of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Source: Learning Times